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action by the plaintiffs to reaffirm a judgment obtained against
the defendant and appellant on December 3, 1973.
It is undisputed, and appears on the record, that plaintiffs filed their action to reaffirm the judgment on February 5,
1982 (Plaintiffs' Complaint), more than eight years after entry
of the original judgment agtainst the defendant.
Defendant answered, raising as a defense the statute
of limitations contained in §78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, (Defendant's Answer).
Plaintiffs then embarked upon protracted and lengthy
discovery (Notice of Taking Deposition dated May 12, 1982, Notice
of Taking Deposition dated October 21, 1982, Notice of Taking
Deposition dated October 26, 1982, Notice of Taking Depositions
dated January 26, 1983).
Depositions were designed to determine what days the
defendant may have been out of the State of Utah on business or
vacations from the date the original judgment was entered until
the date that the instant action was filed.
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was
heard before the Honorable Judith Billings on May 26, 1983.
Judge Billings ruled that all times when the defendant was out of
the State after entry of judgment tolled the statute and was not
a part of the period of time provided for the commencement of an
action upon the judgment and denied defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
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plaintiffs1 action should have been barred as not timely filed.
2.

Even if each of defendant's absences should have

been excluded from the period of the running of the statute of
limitations by virtue of said statute, only those whole days
during which the defendant was absent from the State should be
counted towards the time for tolling the statute of limitations.
ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT WAS NOT "ABSENT FROM THE STATE,"
NO BASIS EXISTED FOR TOLLING THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS AND PLAINTIFFS1 ACTION
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE BARRED AS
NOT TIMELY FILED.
The most recent judgment obtained by plaintiffs against
defendant was signed and entered on December 3, 1973. Although
defendant resided openly within the State of Utah from that date
until the present date, no attempts were made by plaintiffs or
plaintiffs1 counsel to serve garnishment, execution or other
legal process upon him.

There were no attempts to serve process

against the defendant until February 20, 1982, when he was successfully served at his home.

After defendant raised the statute

of limitations of §78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, plaintiffs1 counsel embarked upon a course of discover
stretching out well over a year to determine each and every time
that the defendant had left the State of Utah for any purpose
whatsoever.

No claim was ever made that the plaintiffs had

attempted to serve process during any of these absences or that
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time limited for the commencement of the
action.
Early cases dealing with this statute were inconsistent.
Cases decided between 1908 and 1924 reached opposite conclusions
but the most recent statement of this court in Buell v. Duchesne
Merchantile Co., 231 P. 123 (1924), held that each absence from
the state tolled the statute of limitations notwithstanding the
fact that the debtor maintains a resident in the state with persons residing there upon whom service of process might be had.
That case would appear to be directly opposite of the position
urged by defendant, here.

Defendant seeks to have this case

overruled to the extent that it has not already been overruled by
the case of Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915, 15 Utah 2d 254 (1964).
In that case, the court specifically found that the statute was
not tolled against a non-resident motorist by virtue of the
availability of service of process upon the secretary of state.
In discussing the tolling statute and the effects of alternative
service upon it, the court stated:
It is obvious that the objective of the
statute above quoted is to prevent a
defendant from depriving a plaintiff of
the opportunity of suing him by absenting
himself from the state during the period
of limitation. In connection with the
plaintifffs contention, it is necessary to
also consider our Non-resident Motorist
Act, §41-12-8, U.C.A. 1953, which was
enacted in 1933, (S.L.U. 1943, Chap. 68,
§12). It authorizes service upon a nonresident of the state by serving the
secretary of state. The effect of this is
to constitute the secretary of state as
the agent of a non-resident motorist to

receive process for him. Further pertinent to this problem is Rule 4(e)(1)
U.R.C.P., which states that personal service may be made upon a defendant "• . .
by delivering a copy to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process." [Emphasis
the Court's] The defendants thus had an
agent within the state upon whom process
could have been served for them, and they
were thus not "absent" from the state in
the sense contemplated by the statute,
that is, unavailable for service of process. Therefore, the plaintiff was not
prevented from commencing her action at
any time she desired. That being so,
there exists no reason for tolling the
running of the statute.
Although the present case does not involve the Nonresident Motorist Act, Rule 4(e)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
also provides for service upon a defendant "by leaving such copy
at his usual place of abode with sorne person of s 1 11 t:ab 1 e age and
discretion there residing;" it was undisputed throughout this
case that there was always someone at home at defendant's residence throughout any of the times that he was physicalLy absent
from the State of Utah.

He simply was not absent from the State

in the sense contemplated by Snyder v. Clune, supra, that is,
unavailable for the service of process.
A later case, Gass v. Hunting, 561 P.2d 1071 (Utah
1977), at first glance, appears to refuse to extend this principle beyond the non-resident motorist statute.

The facts of

that case are unclear from the five paragraph decision which states simply that a si Ii t oi i a judgraent m a y be comin.enced di ir11 ig
eight years after entry thereof and an absence from the State

-7-

tolls the eight-year period.

It is unclear exactly what argu-

ments were made in that case or whether that case may properly be
used to support any position in this case.
Snyder v. Clune, supra, has been cited as well-reasoned
authority for similar decisions outside of the State of Utah.
See Carter v. Kreschmer, 577 P.2d 1211 (Kan.App. 1978); Tarter v.
Insco, 550 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1976); Byrne v. Ogle, 488 P.2d 716
(Alaska 1971).

While all of these cases involve non-resident

motorist statutes, other courts have found the reasoning behind
the decision in Snyder v. Clune, supra, equally applicable to
civil actions as a whole.
In Selby v. Karman, 521 P.2d 609 (Ariz. 1974), the
court dealt with an undistinguished tort action and, under a
nearly identical tolling statute found that an absence, for vacations and business, of 52 days out of a two-year period of limitations would not be counted under the tolling statute and barred
plaintiff's action.

The court stated:

[W]e, therefore, hold that the terms
"without the state11 and "absence" as used
in A.R.S. §12-501 mean out of the state in
the sense that service of process in any
of the methods authorized by rule or
statute cannot be made upon the defendant
to secure personal jurisdiction by the
trial court.
The Kansas Supreme Court applied this reasoning to a
medical malpractice claim in Bray v. Bayles, 618 P.2d 807 (Kan.
1980).

In that case one of the defendants was absent from the

state at different times for a total of 23 days prior to the fil-

-R-

ing o f p 1 a I r 11 i f f ' s a c t: i oi i • T h e c o x1 • f >1 p h e 1 d t: h e i e c I s I o n < :) f the
Court of Appeals that absence from i:he state meant beyond the
reach of process of Kansas courts.

The court found:

Under the circumstances of this case, the
statute of limitations was not tolled even
though both defendants were out of the
state for the brief periods of time indicated above, since it was possible for
the plaintiffs to obtain service on the
defendants at all times. This could have
been accomplished either by serving them
under the long-arm statute, K.S.A.
60-308(b)(2), or simply requesting an
order from the district court allowing
service to be made by leaving a copy of
the petition and summons at the residence
of each defendant as authorized by K.S.A.
60-304(a).
The latter method c: f service is available to all pi aintiffs in
the State of Utah without order of the court.

See also Lipe v.

Javelin Tire Co., Inc. , 536 P.2d 291 (Idaho 1975); Beebie v.
Shelley, 610 P.2d 713 (Mont, 1980); and Leggett v. Stricklind,
640 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1981).

Each of the cases cited here by

defendant reaches its conclusion with respect to the toll Ing
statute by the same reasoning employed by this court in Snyder v.
Clune, supra .

.\

:-. clear that plaintiffs made no attempt what-

soever to r- • "• - V

- * oii or serve process upon the defendant dur-

ing the eight-year period following entry of their judgment.

The

defendant did not abscond from the State of Utah in order to
avoid process i Ior • :!i < i I ie conceal himse] f . He was resid11 ig openly
within the State of Utah and was subject to service of process
each and every day of the eight-year period by virtue of Rule

-9-

4(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or through the Utah longarm statute.

Plaintiffs, in this case, simply neglected to file

their action in a timely manner.

The resulting expensive and

protracted discovery in this case itself emphasizes the need for
the rule urged by defendant.

If plaintiffs are allowed to pre-

vail in this appeal, then all plaintiffs faced with an untimely
filing will embark upon any discovery necessary to establish that
the defendant may have taken vacations or business trips outside
of the State of Utah in order to save their claim.

The statute

of limitations is defeated and the purposes of the tolling
statute are not served.
The reasoning of Snyder v. Clune, supra, should be
extended to all civil actions.

The defendant should be con-

sidered absent from the State only when he is unavailable for
service of process and plaintiffs' complaint should be barred as
not timely filed.
II.
IF ALL ABSENCES ARE TO BE COUNTED FOR
PURPOSES OF THE TOLLING STATUTE, THEN ONLY
FULL DAYS SHOULD BE COUNTED.
The very necessity for this argument points out the need
for a redefinition of "absence11 as urged by defendant, above.
The tolling statute, §78-12-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, states, in pertinent part:
. . . The time of his absence is not part
of the time limited for the commencement
of the action.

The question then arises as to how

;

>..- is to be measured.

Is it weeks, days, hours or even minutes?
The trial c

in the present action, had trouble

dealing with that issue and relied upon §68-3-7, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, in deciding that the first day of
the absenci AMI1<1 )M> exe i utloil ,ind thr* I ist I iv wo:; i "?«-

•

led.

This was the ruling of the court despite a lack of urging by
Plaintiffs1 position

counsel for either plaintiffs or defendant.

was that both the first and last days of the absence should be
counted and defendant's position was that the first and the last
days should be excluded since, on both the first and last day,
the defendant would be within the State of Utah and avai Iable for
service of process for at least part of that day.
This position is supported by the case of Pina v.
Watson, 564 P.2d 916 (Ariz.App. 1977).

In that case, the court,

operating under Selby v. Karman, supra, it found that only those
timet

i

lefendant was unavailab] e for service of process

would be counted for the tolling statute.

The plaintiff

attempted to show that during two one-week vacations there was no
one at home for ser »ri ce of process and alternative ser vi ce was
unavailable because the defendants whereabouts were unknown.
The court determined that there were two days on the vacation
when their whereabouts coiild n. . -»e :ediona::.

• : *.

18-hour periods when they were in transit, and on the road.
pli!r

'•"

.'.

'

»'*-;•

in answer thereto, stated:
11

- »
The

periods ana the court,

We disagree with the opponents1 interpretation and application of Selby v. Karman,
supra. It stretches a literal reading of
the case -- and logic -- too far to say
that a defendant is absent from the state
unless he is amenable to process every
hour of every day. We do not believe our
Supreme Court intended that "absence" and
"without the state" be defined in terms of
that kind of absolute continuous availability for service of process, or to
allow a plaintiff to aggregate hours during periods of absence would create a virtually undefined limitations period which
would be unfair to the defendant and procedurally unmanageable.
We conclude that in order to toll the
statute of -limitations, a plaintiff at a
minimum must be able to show whole days
when the defendant could not be served
with process. Where a defendant could
have been located with reasonable diligence on any part of a day, he is not
"absent" or "without the state" within the
meaning of the tolling statute and Selby.
It is clear that on the first and the last days of the
periods attempted to be established by the plaintiffs that the
defendant was either leaving the State or arriving in the State
during that day and was, therefore, available for service of process during part of that day.

Under the reasoning of Pina v.

Watson, supra, those days should not be included in any period
for tolling the statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
Methods of substitute service under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and the long-arm statute have eliminated the need
for the strict rule of Buell v. Duchesne Merchantile Co., supra.

T h e b e 11 e i re as oned ri 11e, and that a d o p ? P < 1 11 1 i 1 ear1y a ] J ne I g h boring jurisdictions, is that "absence" - m i "without the state"
for purposes of the tolling provisions of §78-12-35, Utah Code
Annotated, should mean unavailable l.'nt service of pn>ees\

Since

defendant was available for service of process throughout the
eight years following entry of judgment for plaintiffs, plaintiffs 1 action to reinstate or reaffirm the judgment was not
timely filed and should be barred by the statute of limitations.
The judgment

il: the tria,

;ir

±:\ \ '

i

idgment

of dismissal entered for defendant.
If the court finds that each day of absence must,
indeed, be excluded i inder the tolling stati ite, then only those
full days during which the defendant was absent from the State
should be counted and the first and last days of anu business or
pleasure trips should be excluded.
Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 1985.

STRONG & HANNI
By
William F. Bannon
Attorneys for Defendant

-rj

_____

ADDENDUM

THOMAS A. DUFFIN (0927.
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN S ENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-8020
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GAIL C. VAN TASSELL,
and AFTON VAN TASSELL,

]
]1

J U D G M E N T

Plaintiffs, [
vs.

;

ELWOOD C. SHAFFER,

i

Civil No. C82-1011

Defendant , )
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the Honorable Leonard H, Russon, one of the judges of the
.,
Duffin appear; , ro; ^ *.
Tassell *r

Afton

jvh «*t

Tassel.
• **** * r

•

1984

"Thomas

i * < plaintiffs, Gail (

and William .• 3annon appearing
*«.•-,

court heard the respective testimony of Elwoo^

whereupon the
Shaffer and

being fully advised in the premises, and having entered its
Findings <

.

i-mn 1 usioi is c £ I -aw, i low, therefore , on

motion of Thomas A. Duffin,

0

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That Gail C. Van Tassell and Afton Van Tassell

have and recover from Elwood C. Shaffer the sum of $94,954.98,
together with interest at the rate of 12Z per annum from date
hereof, together with plaintiffs costs and disbursements in the
sum of $
Dated this

?>Qr day of October, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

'^1

I.

(4\JL&l\QJU?(

/6u^4*M-7

JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I, Polly Mansfield, Secretary to Thomas A. Duffin,
Attorney for plaintiffs herein, certify that I mailed a copy of
the foregoing Judgment to the following parties by placing a true
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
William F. Bannon
Attorney for Defendant
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

postage prepaid, this / f

1016(4)

day of October, 1984.

J

THOMAS A. DUFFIN (0927)
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-8020
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GAIL C. VAN TASSELL,
and AFTON VAN TASSELL,

]
1
)
Plaintiffs, ]

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

;

ELWOOD C. SHAFFER,

i
Defendant.

Civil No. C82-1011

)

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, one of the judges of the
above entitled court, on the 12th day of October, 1984, Thomas A.
Duffin appearing for and on behalf of the plaintiffs, Gail C. Van
Tassell and Afton Van Tassell, and William F. Bannon appearing
for and on behalf of defendant, Elwood C. Shaffer; whereupon the
court heard the respective testimony of Elwood C. Shaffer and
being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

-2FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That on or about the 19th day of November, 1973,

in the matter of Kamas State Bank, plaintiff, v. Gail C. Van
Tassell, Charles 0. Shaffer and Elwood C. Shaffer, defendants,
Civil No. 4386, in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for
Summit County, State of Utah, entered judgment by the plaintiff
against the defendants, Gail C. Van Tassell, Charles 0. Shaffer
and Elwood C. Shaffer for the sum of $33,162.12.
2.

In the same case of Kamas State Bank, plaintiff,

v. Gail C. Van Tassell, Charles 0. Shaffer and Elwood C. Shaffer,
defendants, Civil No. 4386, in the Fourth Judicial District Court
in and for Summit County, State of Utah, on December 3, 1973, the
court entered judgment as follows:
"WHEREFORE BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW AND BY THE REASON
OF THE PREMISES AFORESAID IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
"1. That Gail C. Van Tassell have and recover
from Elwood C. Shaffer a judgment for any and all
sums paid by Gail C. Van Tassell to the plaintiff,
Kamas State Bank, on the deficiency judgment of
$33,162.12 entered herein by Kamas State Bank
together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum
for any and all payments made on the judgment
until reimbursed by Elwood C. Shaffer.
"2. That Gail C. Van Tassell do have and recover
from the defendant, Elwood C. Shaffer, a judgment
in the sum of $17,889.00 together with interest at
the rate of 8% per annum from date hereof until
paid together with Van Tassell's costs and
disbursements incurred in this action amounting to
the sum of $105.00."

-33.

That on the 1st day of February, 1974, in the

matter of Kamas State Bank, plaintiff, v. Gail C. Van Tassell,
Charles 0. Shaffer and Elwood C. Shaffer, defendants, Civil No.
4386, in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Summit
County, State of Utah, an Assignment of Judgment was duly
assigned by Kamas State Bank to Afton Van Tassell, wife of Gail
C. Van Tassell on the judgment of $33,162.12 entered the 19th day
of November, 1973.
4.

That the parties stipulated in open court that the

judgments were valid and subsisting and that the judgment of the
3rd day of December, 1973, incorporated the deficiency judgment
of the Kamas State Bank against Gail C. Van Tassell and
incorporated the judgment by Kamas State Bank against Gail C. Van
Tassell and Elwood C. Shaffer and then in turn gave Gail C. Van
Tassell a judgment over and against Elwood C. Shaffer for the
amount entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court.
5.

That Gail C. Van Tassell and Afton Van Tassell as

plaintiffs, v. Elwood C. Shaffer, defendant, in the within
entitled matter, Civil No. C82-1011, commenced an action to renew
the said judgments on the 5th day of February, 1982.
6.

The court finds that between December 3, 1973, and

December 3, 1982, that the defendant, Elwood C. Shaffer, had
absented himself from the State of Utah and was not within the
state and the court finds that in computing the time for

-4determining how long the defendant was out of state, has excluded
the first day and included the last day from the time that he
left the state until the time that he arrived back in the state
of Utah and the court further finds that Elwood C. Shaffer was
out of the state of Utah as computed above during the following
periods of time:

Cltz

Year

Atlantic City
St, Louis Missouri
Miami, Florida
Pocatello, Idaho
Aselomar, California
Springfield, Missouri
Rochester, New York
Jackson, Wyoming

1974
1975
1977
1975
1975
1974
1976
1977

Houston, Texas
Aselonar, California
Memphis, Tennessee
Traverse City,
Phoenix, Arizona
Reno, Nevada
Branson, Missouri
New Orleans,

1978
1978
1978
1978
1980
1980
1980
1981

Month

Days Out
of State
4
4
4
1
4
10
4
4

June and
July
January
February
July
August
January
February
August
January

4
4
16
3
6
3
20
5

TOTAL

96 days

-57.

The court thus finds that the defendant, Elwood

Shaffer, during the period of time from December 3, 1973, through
December 3, 1982, was out of Utah for a period of 96 days.
8.

That the amount due and owing on the Judgment

assigned to Afton Van Tassell is the sum of $33,162.12, together
with interest at the rate of SX per annum in the sum of
$28,519.32 or a total of $61,681.44.
9.

That the amount due and owing on the judgment of

December 3, 1973, to Gail C. Van Tassell, is the sum of
$17,889.00, together with interest in the sum of $15,384.54, or a
total of $33,273.54, together with court costs in that action of
$105.00.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes the following Conslusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the plaintiffs, Gail C. Van Tassell and Afton

Van Tassell, are entitled to a judgment against Elwood C. Shaffer
for the sum of $94,954.98, together with interest at the rate of
12Z per annum from date hereof, togehter with plaintiff's costs
and disbursements in the sum of $
2.

The court finds that pursuant to Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, §78-12-35 that the 96 days that Elwood C.
Shaffer absented himself from the state of Utah, is not part of
the tine limited for the commencement of the action.

-6Dated this

day of October, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I, Polly Mansfiald, Secretary to Thomas A. Duffin,
Attorney for plaintiffs herein, certify that I mailed a copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law to the
following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
William F.' Bannon
Attorney for Defendant
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
postage prepaid, this

//

day of October, 1984.

Mr

THOMAS A. DUFFIN of
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-8020
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GAIL G. VAN TASSELL,
and AFTON VAN TASSELL,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
ELWOOD C. SHAFFER,
Civil No. C82-1011
Defendant.
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on the 26th day of May, 1983, before the Honorable Judith M.
Billings, one of the judges of the above entitled court, Thomas
A. Duffin appearing for and on behalf of plaintiffs and William
F. Bannon appearing for and on behalf of defendant, and the court
having examined the depositions in the above entitled matter and
it further appearing that the defendant was out of the state for
substantial periods of time during the period of time after the
Judgment was rendered.
The court finds that the days and periods of time when
the defendant was out of the state after entry of judgment as

-2provided for in the plaintiffs' Complaint tolls the statute and
is not part of the period of time provided for the commencement
of an action upon a judgment.

Now, therefore, on motion of

Thomas A. Duffin,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

is hereby denied.
Dated this

day of June, 1983.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I, Polly Mansfield, Secretary to Thomas A. Duffin,
Attorney for plaintiffs herein, certify that I mailed a copy of
the foregoing Order to the following parties by placing a true
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
William F. Bannon
Attorney for Defendant
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
postage prepaid, this

day of June, 1983.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Neff, 43 U. 258, 134 P. 1160, following
Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 U. 108, 66 P. 773,
91 Am. St. Rep. 783.
Rule that where administrator is barred
by lapse of time, heirs are also barred,
had no application where property had
been distributed in accordance with statute, and heir seeking to recover such property distributed to him while he was minor
within two years after he attained majority was not barred from maintaining
action, since limitation did not start to
run against plaintiff until he had attained
majority under this section. Bobbins v.
Duggins, 61 U. 542, 216 P. 232, distinguished in 13 U. (2d) 404, 375 P. 2d 461.
Fact that seven years had not passed
since heirs had reached age of majority did
not preclude running of statute of limitations so as to bar them from intervening
in quiet title action to claim an interest
as heirs where property descending to them
from their father's estate had been distributed to a guardian who had had possession or right to possession of that property
for more than the required seven years.
Parr v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 13 U. (2d)
404, 375 P. 2d 461.
Purchaser at tax sale.
Where defendant purchased tax deed
from county, and immediately thereafter
entered into possession of property, paid
taxes on property for statutory time, made
valuable improvements on property, and
held property openly and notoriously, he
was entitled to have title to property in

78-12-22

controversy against all parties except those
under disability. Baker v. Goodman, 57
U. 349, 194 P. 117.
Collateral References.
Limitation of Actions€=>70 et seq.
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §216
et seq.
51 Am. Jur. 2d 747 et seq., Limitation
of Actions § 178 et seq.
Imprisonment as tolling statute of limitations, 24 A. L. R. 2d 618.
Infancy or incompetency of one on
whom legal title devolved as interrupting
adverse possession previously initiated, 65
A. L. R. 975.
Prescription or adverse possession
against one under disability of infancy,
coverture, or mental incompetency, 43
A. L. R. 941, 147 A. L. R. 236.
Proof of unadjudged incompetency which
prevents running of statute of limitations,
9 A. L. R. 2d 964.
Statute providing that an insane person, minor, or other person under disability may bring suit within specified
time after removal of disability as affecting right to bring action before disability removed, 109 A. L. R. 954.
Tacking disabilities for purposes of the
statute, 53 A. L. R. 1303.
Time of existence of mental incompetency which will prevent or suspend running of statute of limitations, 41 A. L. R.
2d 726.

ARTICLE 2
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY
Section 78-12-22. Within eight years.
78-12-23. Within six years.
78-12-24. Public officers—Within six years.
78-12-25. Within four years.
78-12-25.5. Injury due to defective design or construction of improvement to
real property—Within seven years.
78-12-26. Within three years.
78-12-27. Action against corporate stockholders or directors.
78-12-28. Within two years.
78-12-29. Within one year.
78-12-30. Actions on claims against county, city or town.
78-12-31. Within six months.
78-12-32. Action on mutual account—When deemed accrued.
78-12-33. Actions by state.
78-12-34. No limitation against recovery of bank deposits or other property.

78-12-22. Within eight years.—Within eight years :
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States,
or of any state or territory within the United States.
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78-12-22

JUDICIAL CODE

Aii action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure
to provide support or maintenance for dependent children.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-22; L. 1975, ch. 96, § 26.
Compiler's Notes.
Prior to the 1975 amendment, this section was identical to former section 1042-21 (Code 1943) which was repealed by
Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
The 1975 amendment added the second
paragraph, relating to support.
Separability Clause.
Section 27 of Laws 1975, ch. 96 provided:
"If any provision of this act, or the application of any provision of this act to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the
remainder of this act shall not be affected
thereby."
Cross-References.
Execution to issue within eight years,
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69(a).
Judgment a lien for eight years, 7822-1.
Uniform Act on Paternity, 78-45a-l et
seq.
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
78-45-1 et seq.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 77-61a-l et seq.
Alimony and child support arrearages.
The eight-year statute of limitations applies to past due unpaid installments for
alimony or support of minor children, and
therefore execution may issue only for the
arrearages accumulated within a period
of eight years. Seeley v. Park, 532 P. 2d
684.
Effect of stipulations.
Parties to contract may stipulate for
period of limitations shorter than that
fixed by statute of limitations. Clark v.
Lund, 55 U. 284, 184 P. 821.
Fraudulent conveyance.
This section was not a bar to an action
to impress judgment lien on property where
complaint alleged that property had been
transferred to defraud creditors, and that
property was held in trust for defendant.
Moulton v. Morgan, 115 U. 119, 202 P.
2d 723.
Installments.
In case of a judgment payable in installments, statute runs from time fixed for
payment of each installment for the part
then payable, and not from date of the
judgment. Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile
Co., 64 U. 391, 231 P. 123.

Where judgment payable in installments
provided that plaintiff could have execution for total amount due if default in
payments should be made, plain intent
was that execution should issue for only
such amounts as were due at time of default so that statute did not begin to
run from date of default. Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 U. 391, 231 P.
123.
Judgment on contract.
Where judgment was rendered in favor
of creditor in an action founded on contract, the debt did not thereafter retain
its original character as a contract debt,
but a new cause of action on the judgment
was substituted, and the statute of limitation with respect to judgments applied to
an action to renew the judgment. Yergensen v. Ford, 16 U. (2d) 397, 402 P. 2d 696.
Limitation period not tolled.
Action to renew a judgment brought
more than eight years after the date of
entry of the original judgment was barred
by this section even though defendant
had signed a written agreement acknowledging the obligation and had made some
payments thereon less than eight years
before commencement of the action. The
common-law rule which tolled the limitation period in case of acknowledgment or
part payment is limited by 78-12-44 so that
it now applies only to contract actions.
Yergensen v. Ford, 16 U. (2d) 397, 402
P. 2d 696.
Mortgage foreclosure decree.
Mortgage foreclosure decree could not
be collaterally attacked for mortgagee's
failure to serve proper representative of
estate of deceased mortgagor, where defendants in that action defaulted, no appeal was taken and foreclosure decree had
become final, and where foreclosure record
did not show such error or defect on its
face; this section afforded no defense to
subsequent action to quiet title instituted
by mortgagee who purchased at foreclosure
sale. Zion's Ben. Bldg. Soc. v. Geary, 112
U. 548, 189 P. 2d 964.
Pleadings.
Complaint based on judgment is timely
under this section though filed one day
after expiration of eight-year limitation
period where previous day was Sunday, in
view of former sections 88-2-7 and 88-2-8
(Code 1943). Nelson v. Jorgenson, 66 U.
360, 242 P. 945.
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78-12-35

78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred here.
78-12-46. "Action" includes special proceeding.
78-12-47. Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in malpractice actions.

78-12-35. Effect of absence from state.—If when a cause of action

accrues against a person when he is out of the state, the action may be
commenced within the term herein limited after his return to the state;
and if after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time
of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of
the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-35.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-36 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Application of section.
The full time that the debtor is out of
the state must be excluded in computing
the time, notwithstanding fact that
debtor's family may have residence or
place of abode in state and that service of
process could be made upon some member
of debtor's family at its residence or
place of abode. Keith-O'Brien Co. v.
Snyder, 51 U. 227, 169 P. 954, applying
former statute.
Statute runs only during time debtor
is openly in state, and immediately on
his leaving it the statute again ceases to
run until his return; in computing time
all periods of absence must be considered
and added together. Keith-O'Brien Co. v.
Snyder, 51 U. 227, 169 P. 954, applying
former statute.
Maintenance of residence within state
with persons living therein did not prevent tolling of statute of limitations.
Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 U.
391, 231 P. 123, applying former statute.
Construction of section.
Although generally statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed, it is
also a well-recognized doctrine that when
such statutes contain provisions excepting certain persons or classes from operation of statutes, those exceptions are to
be strictly construed. Lawson v. Tripp,
34 U. 28, 95 P. 520.
Laches.
Absence of defendant from state does
not preclude interposition of defense of
laches to suit for an accounting, even
though statute of limitations has not
barred proceeding. Smith v. Smith, 77 U.
60, 291 P. 298.

Proof of residence or nonresidence.
A finding that defendant had his home,
family and residence in state continuously from time debt was contracted is
sufficient finding of continuous presence
in the state. Woolf v. Gray, 48 U. 239,
158 P. 788.
Plaintiff seeking to toll statute has burden of proof; mere proof of nonresidence
is not a prima facie showing of absence
from state. Tracey v. Blood, 78 U. 385, 3
P. 2d 263, applying identically worded
Idaho statute.
Tolling of statute as to foreign corporation.
Where answer of defendant foreign corporation set up statute of limitations as
defense and face of pleadings and uncontradicted evidence indicated statute had
run, it was incumbent on plaintiff to state
in his reply conditions tolling the statute;
in Utah, foreign corporation's privilege of
pleading statute of limitations was not
conditioned on its compliance with "doing
business within the state" statutes. Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Dev. Co., 72 U.
137, 269 P. 147, 59 A. L. R. 1318, applying
former statutes.
Words and phrases defined.
The words "return" and "departs" in
this section comprehend all persons who
are without the state, and are not confined to the inhabitants thereof. Burnes
v. Crane, 1 U. 179, applying former statute.
Word "return" as used in this section
includes nonresidents as well as citizens
of state who have gone abroad and returned to state; the words "return to the
state" are held to be equivalent to "come
into the state." Lawson v. Tripp, 34 U.
28, 95 P. 520, applying former statute.
Collateral References.
Limitation of Actions^=>84, 85.
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 211.
51 Am. Jur. 2d 725 et seq., Limitation of
Actions § 154 et seq.
Absence of judgment debtor from state
as suspending or tolling running of period
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STATUTES

Collateral References.
Statutes<§=>232.
82 C.J.S. Statutes § 386.
73 Am. Jur. 2d 505, Statutes § 384.
Adoption of compiled or revised statutes
as giving effect to former repealed or suspended provisions contained therein, 12 A.
L. R. 2d 423.
Constitutionality and construction of repeal or modification by legislative action
of teachers' tenure statute, as regards retrospective operation, 147 A. L. R. 293.
Constitutional requirement that repealing or amendatory statute refer to statute

repealed or amended, applicability to repeal or amendment by implication, 5 A. L
R. 2d 1270.
Retroactive application of repeal of
statute which operated as limitation of or
exception to a substantive right of action
in tort otherwise arising at common law,
120 A. L. R. 943.
Simultaneous repeal and re-enactment of
all, or part, of legislative act, 77 A. L. R.
2d 336.
Unconstitutionality of later statute as
affecting provision purporting specifically
to repeal earlier statute, 102 A. L. R. 802.

68-3-6. Identical provisions deemed a continuation, not new enactment.—The provisions of any statute, so far as they are the same as those
of any prior statute, shall be construed as a continuation of such provisions,
and not as a new enactment.
History: Code Report; R. S. 1933 & C.
1943, 88-2-6.
Re-enactment of statute.
By re-enacting statutes Supreme Court
must assume that legislature was satisfied with construction court placed upon
statute before re-enactment. State v. Roberts, 56 IT. 136, 190 P. 351.
Re-enactment of statutes of limitation
by R. S. 1933 amounted not to a repeal
of the antecedent sections, but to a reaffirmation thereof. Attorney General v.
Pomeroy, 93 U. 426, 73 P. 2d 1277, 114
A. L. R. 726.

Collateral References.
Statutes<£=>147, 223.5.
82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 276, 370.
73 Am. Jur. 2d 469, Statutes § 322.
Presumption that, in re-enacting statute,
legislature adopted previous judicial construction thereof, as applied to construction by trial or intermediate appellate
court, 146 A. L. R. 923.
Simultaneous repeal and re-enactment of
all, or part, of legislative act, 79 A. L. R.
2d 336.

68-3-7. Time, how computed.—The time in which any act provided
by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day and including
the last, unless the last is a holiday, and then it also is excluded.
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 2493;
C. L. 1917, §5843; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-7.
Cross-References.
Computation of time, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(a).
Enlargement of time for doing an act,
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(b).
Holidays, 63-13-2.
Judicial notice as to measure of time,
78-25-1.
Juvenile Court Act, time to be computed
in accordance with Rules of Civil Procedure, 78-3a-27.
Bills of exceptions.
This section was applied in determining
whether thirty-day period prescribed by
former section 104-39-4, Code 1943, had expired before application was made for extension of time under former section 10442-7, Code 1943. Independent Gas & Oil

Co. v. Beneficial Oil Co., 71 U. 348, 266 P.
267.
Computation of time in general
Where statute requires or permits act to
be done within stated number of days
from or after a designated day, it is timely
if done on the last day of the stated number; but where statute prescribes period
within which act may not be done as not
less than a certain number of days before
designated day, act must be done without
such period and cannot be performed on
any day within such period, both designated day and most remote day within
period being excluded as days on which
act may be done. Wood v. Cowan, 68 TJ.
388, 250 P. 979; Anderson v. Cook, 102
U. 265, 130 P. 2d 278, 143 A. L. R. 987.
Daylight saving time.
The courts will take judicial notice of
the fact that a certain system of time is
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Rule 4(e)

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Where defendant "may be found."
Where defendant was served in transitory tort action in county of residence,
court acquired jurisdiction of action despite fact t h a t acts complained of occurred
in different county. Sanipoli v. Pleasant
Valley Coal Co., 31 U. 114, 86 P . 865, 10
Ann. Cas. 1142, applying R. S. 1898, § 2940.
Where obligors on bond were sued in

county other than county of their residence and were personally served, court
had jurisdiction over them; the court rejected contention t h a t defendants not having contracted to perform their obligation
at any particular place, the cause of action must be deemed to have arisen where
they reside. Continental Life Ins. & Inv.
Co. v. Jones, 31 U. 403, 88 P. 229.

(e) Personal Service in this State. Personal service within the state
shall be as follows:
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 years or over, by delivering
a copy thereof to him personally, or by leaving such copy at his usual
place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there
residing; or by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is modeled after Fed. Rule
4(d)(1).
Gross-References.
Condominium ownership, service of process on person designated in declaration,
57-8-33.
Failure to serve summons upon defendant, motion for relief, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b).
Highways, service of process on nonresident motorist using, 41-12-8.
Insurance agent or broker, agent for
service of process on nonresident, 31-17-35.
News gathering, service of process on
person in business of, 50-2-7.
Nonresidents, acts submitting person to
jurisdiction of state courts, 78-27-22 to 7827-24.
Parties not originally served, proceedings after judgment, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 71B(b).
Prisoners, service of process on, 17-22-6.
Real estate broker, agent for service of
process on nonresident, 61-2-6.
Real estate brokers and salesmen, notice of hearing on license, 61-2-12.
Sheriff, service of process on as party,
17-22-25.
Enticement into state.
P a r t y invited into state by plaintiff to
discuss disputed matter was not subject
to service of process for reasonable time
covering negotiation period and his coming to and returning from meeting. Western States Refining Co. v. Berry, 6 U. (2d)
336, 313 P . 2d 480.

Secretary of state as agent.
Nonresident motorists were not "absent
from the s t a t e " so as to toll the statute
of limitations although they left the state
immediately after collision and remained
without s t a t e , because process could have
been served upon secretary of state.
Snyder v. Clune, 15 U. (2d) 254, 390 P.
2d 915.
Collateral References.
Process<§=>57, 58.
72 C.J.S. Process §§ 26 to 42.
62 Am. J u r . 2d 828, Process § 47.
Armed forces: service of process on
person in military service by serving person at civilian abode or residence, or leaving copy there, 46 A. L. R. 2d 1239.
Construction of phrase "usual place of
abode," or similar terms referring to
abode, residence, or domicil, as used in
statutes relating to service of process, 32
A. L. R. 3d 112.
Doing business: what amounts to doing
business in a state within s t a t u t e providing for service of process in action against
nonresident natural person or persons doing business in state, 10 A. L. R. 2d 200.
F r a u d or trickery, a t t a c k on personal
service as having been obtained by, 98
A. L. R. 2d 551.
Necessity, in service by leaving process
at place of abode, etc., of leaving a copy
of summons for each p a r t y sought to be
served, 8 A. L. R. 2d 343.
Place or manner of delivering or depositing papers, under statutes permitting
service of process by leaving copy at usual
place of abode or residence, 87 A. L. R. 2d
1163.

(2) Upon a natural person under the age of 14 years, by delivering
a copy thereof to such person and also to his father, mother or guardian;
or, if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the
20
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